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THE RAILROAD PASSENGER PROBLEM:
AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES AS
BASES FOR A NEW MODEL*
Railroad empire-builder James J. Hill is said to have compared
the passenger train to the male teat, characterizing it as "neither
useful nor ornamental." 1 Hill's cryptic comment, made at a time
when the passenger train was nearly the exclusive means of
intercity transportation in the United States,2 represents one posi-
tion in a continuing debate. 3 On one side, railroad industry
officials contend that, when their industry was being forced to
absorb the costs of providing a poorly patronized passenger ser-
vice, they were providing a service neither demanded by public
necessity nor justified by the responsibilities owed to corporate
shareholders and freight shipping customers. 4 Examining the
*The author gratefully acknowledges the cordial and competent assistance of Rhoda
Berkowitz, Chief Reference Librarian, and Emelyn House, U.S. Government Documents
Librarian, at the University of Michigan Law Library, in locating and suggesting many of
the sources used in this article.
'J. STOVER, THE LIFE AND DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN RAILROAD 197 (1970).
2 See H. PORTER, Railway Passenger Travel, in THE AMERICAN RAILWAY 228 (1897).
See also J. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 37-63 (1961),
3 See generally Hearings on S. 3020 Before the Surface Transportation Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)
[hereinafter cited as 1960 Hearings]; Hearings on S. 325, S. 348, S. 1234, and S. 1289
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., set. 89-11 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as 1965 Hearings]; Hearings on S. 3861 Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong.. 2d Sess., ser. 90-81
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 12084, H.R. 744,
H.R. 785, H.R. 3112, H.R. 521, H.R. 9168, H.R. 14170, H.R. 13347, H.R. 13352,
H.R. 13832, H.R. 14661, and HJ. Res. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess., set. 91-31 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]; Hearings on S. 924 and
S. 2425 Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-69 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 709, H.R. 913, H.R. 4570,
H.R. 5715, H.R. 6707, H.R. 6734, H.R. 6749, H.R. 7412, H.R. 7481, H.R. 7814,
H.R. 7971, and H.R. 9533 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-54,
pt. 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Hearings]; Hearings on the Administration's
Request for Additional Funding for Amtrak Before the Subcomm. on Surface Trans-
portation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 92-29 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]; G. HILTON, THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF
1958 (1969); P. LYON, To HELL IN A DAY COACH (1968); Bard,The Challenge of Rail
Passenger Service, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 301 (1967); Laird & Thoms, End of the Line, 15
LOYOLA L. REV. 263 (1969); Thomas, Public Utilities: Discontinuance of Railroad Ser-
vice, 14 RUTGERS L. REV.345 (1960); Thoms & Laird, Derailing The Passenger, 36 ICC
PRAC. J. 1118 (1958).
'See 1969 Hearings, supra note 3, at 212-56. See also Watt, Rail Passenger Trans-
portation in PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 325- 48 (S. Hollander ed. 1968).
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problem from a different perspective, railroad enthusiasts and
representatives of consumer lobbies argue that the maintenance of
passenger train service is essential to public convenience and
forms a necessary part of a balanced national transportation sys-
tem.5 Economists, considering the relative value of the service as
compared with its cost, draw different conclusions as to what part
of the service, if any, should be retained.6
This inquiry does not consider the complex and countervailing
policies underlying the fundamental issue of whether passenger
trains remain a necessary and viable means of transportation.
Rather, it assumes that the findings of the Congress, as embodied
in the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 7 conclusively establish
the public necessity for passenger train service. The relevant area
of inquiry is therefore narrowed to a consideration of the proper
means of providing this service. This article examines the charac-
ter of the rail passenger problem, identifies the American and
British governments' responses and proposes a hybrid model of a
rail passenger service organization based on several intrinsic char-
acteristics of these existing systems. The article implies that the
profit standard inadequately measures the success of a public
utility, and suggests the adoption of an eclectic standard that
measures enterprise success in terms of economic viability, re-
sponse to public need, and quality of service rendered. The pro-
posed model involves the rediscovery, application, and com-
bination of two organizational concepts: the public corporation
and the interstate compact.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The American Experience
The rail passenger problem is essentially financial. Rail carriers
5 See, e.g., TRAINS, DEC., 1968 at 3-4, 13. See also 1968 Hearings, supra note 3, at
81-92 (statement of Anthony Haswell, Executive Director, National Association of Rail-
road Passengers).
6 See, e.g., Berge, Why Kill The Passenger Train? in PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION
247-58 (S. Hollander ed. 1968). See also 1968 Hearings, supra note 3, at 47-67 (state-
ment of Prof. George W. Hilton).
745 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq. (1970). The Act states:
The Congress finds that modern, efficient, intercity railroad passenger service
is a necessary part of a balanced transportation system; that the public
convenience and necessity require the continuance and improvement of such
service to provide fast and comfortable transportation between crowded
urban areas and in other areas of the country; that rail passenger service can
help to end the congestion of our highways and the overcrowding of airways
and airports; that the traveler in America should to the maximum extent
feasible have freedom to choose the mode of travel most convenient to his
needs ....
45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
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have long maintained that, despite intensive efforts to improve
and promote the quality of passenger services, revenues fell so far
below costs that continuance of wide-scale passenger service
threatened their viability as privately operated common carriers.,
Although a "passenger deficit" has been a persistent phenome-
non and freight service is clearly more profitable than passenger
service, no industry-wide passenger deficit was reported by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) until 1930.10 Since
1946, such deficits have occurred annually." The magnitude of
the problem is equally troublesome. In 1970, the last full year of
independently operated intercity rail passenger service, the ICC
reported a rail passenger deficit of $476.7 million,' 2 and in 197 1, it
reported that the combined passenger deficits of Class I rail-
roads' 3 accumulated over the period 1951 through 1970 exceeded
$10.7 billion.
14
Although the size of the passenger deficit has been disputed, 15
"See 1968 Hearings, supra note 3. at 92-99 (statement of Thomas M. Goodfellow.
President, Association of American Railroads), 101-26 (statement of William H. Molo-
ney. General Counsel of the Association of American Railroads). See also 1969 Hearings,
supra note 3. at 212-38 (statement of Stuart T. Saunders. Chairman of the Board. Penn
Central Co.). 238-56 (statement of Louis W. Menk. President and Chief Executive
Officer. Northern Pacific Railway Co.). 266-84 (statement of Myron M. Christy. Presi-
dent. The Western Pacific Railroad Co.). 284-305 (statement of W. Thomas Rice, Presi-
dent. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.). 305- 15 (statement of William J. Quinn. Presi-
dent. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.). 454-85,(statement of Thomas M.
Goodfellow).
9 The ICC defines the term "passenger deficit" as, "the amount by which the revenues
from railroad passenger-service operations fall short of covering operating expenses. taxes.
and net rents assigned or apportioned to this service." Railroad Passenger Train Deficit,
306 ICC 417, 419 (1959).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 419. 486. See also 1971 Senate Hearings. supra note 3. at 59 1-92. 805; ICC
ANNUAL REPORTS for the Years 1946- 197 1.
1285 ICC ANN. REP. 61 (1971).
13 A common carrier by rail is currently designated a Class I railroad when its gross
annual revenues attain or exceed five million dollars. See 1971 YEARBOOK OF RAILROAD
FACTS 3.
14 State of Rail Passenger Service (Oct. 30. 197 1) in 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
3. at 592.
15 There has been considerable disagreement about the proper method for most accu-
rately calculating the passenger deficit, but two principal methods are used: those oper-
ating under a theory of fully allocable costs and those utilizing avoidable costs. See
generally S. BERGE, RAILROAD PASSENGER SERVICE COSTS AND FINANCIAL RESULTS
20-26 (1956); S. BERGE. RAILROAD PASSENGER TRENDS 1950-1960 (1961); D. LADD,
COST DATA FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RAILROAD PASSENGER SERVICE (1957):
AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, AVOIDABLE COSTS OF PASSENGER TRAINS SER-
VICE (1957); NATIONAL ASS'N OF R.R. AND UTIL. COMM'RS. REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL
COMM. ON COOPERATION WITH THP ICC IN THE STUDY OF THE RAILROAD PASSENGER
DEFICIT PROBLEM (1952- 1957).
The traditional ICC formula for deficit calculation is a product of the fully allocable
costs theory. An essential part of the formula involves the separation of purely passenger
service related costs from total railroad operating costs. Approximately three-quarters of
the passenger service costs can be identified and separated from freight costs, and these
are designated "solely related expenses." The remaining expenses which cannot be readily
categorized are allocated between passenger and freight services on the basis of "some
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there is general agreement on its precipitating causes and con-
sequent impact. 16 The principal cause of declining passenger rev-
enues has been an American consumer preference for faster and
more flexible intercity transportation. Despite a reluctance to
abandon the passenger train completely,' 7 the consumer in-
appropriate unit of service or work performed." See Separation of Operating Expenses,
Freight and Passenger, 302 ICC 735 (1958). The ICC "appropriate unit" language has
been used to refer to operating cost units such as gross ton-miles, switching locomotive
hours, and locomotive miles. These costing unit factors are then applied to expense
accounts which are common to the provision of both passenger and freight service such as
maintenance of way and structures. See Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 ICC 417,
420 (1959). This method of cost allocation tends to inflate expense figures reported to the
ICC by the railroads as compared with the actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
continuance of passenger train service. The deficit this method produces has been termed
the "ICC full-deficit" and it has been subjected to a good deal of critical comment. See 26
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 806 (1970). See also Berge, supra note 6, at 247-58.
Critics of the "full deficit" maintain that while a fully allocable cost accounting system
may make sense when used by railroad management to categorize expense data for its
internal use, the system has no legitimate function in calculating accurate passenger deficit
because it misstates economic realities. These critics argue that expenses charged to
passenger train service under the fully allocable cost method, such as costs for the
maintenance of way and structures, could not be fully eliminated if there were a curtail-
ment of all such service. See, e.g., Berge.supra note 6. at 247-58. Avoidable costing, it is
suggested, would provide a more accurate means of analyzing the scope of the deficit
because it is based on expenses that would be saved if no passenger train service were
provided. In its simplest form the avoidable cost method produces a solely related expense
figure that represents only one component in the ICC full-deficit formula.
Application of the full-deficit formula to railroad cost figures has resulted in a reported
passenger deficit for every year since 1946. Using the solely related expense method.
passenger service showed a profit as recently as 1962 for Class I railroads as a whole, and,
with regard to the Eastern District carriers, this method indicates a profit on the service
earned for every year from 1958 to 1966. See notes 10- I1 and accompanying text supra.
See also 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 807 (1970).
The ICC. itself, has noted the substantial disparity between the deficit figures produced
by the two methods and. in 1969. issued a report which examined eight rail systems for the
purpose of determining the amount these railroads could have saved if they had not
operated intercity passenger service in 1968. See 82 ICC ANN. REP. 7 (1968). See also 83
ICC ANN. REP. 12-13 (1969). The eight carriers studied accounted for more than 40
percent of the nation's noncommuter rail passenger miles in 1968 and reported a combined
"full" passenger deficit of $214.3 million in 1968. Net avoidable expenses totaled $118
million (before taxes) for the same period. The study concluded that "the ICC full deficit
greatly overstated the savings which the railroad could have made" and that " [a]ll
attempts to portray the passenger burden in terms of that data should ... be wholly
disregarded .... A more adequate method ... lies in the application of avoidable costing."
83 ICC ANN. REP.supra at 12. See also 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 806 (1970). By the time
the ICC reached this conclusion, however, the passenger deficit had become real and
substantial regardless of the accounting method used to compute it. See 1971 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3. at 845-47, 859.
16 See Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 ICC 417, 427- 70 (1959).
17 The passenger train's sentimental. if not practical, hold on the American consumer's
imagination is evidenced by a survey conducted by Louis Harris & Associates for the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation. The survey reported that,
[Bly a margin of 64% to 22%. the 3,000 person attitude survey favored
continuing intercity passenger service 'even if it means federal subsidies.' By
82% to 10% the public feels it 'must have the option' of such ser-
vice ... [aind by a 63% to 23% count. Americans feel 'there is something
exciting about a trip by train.'
Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1972, at 10, col. 4 (midwest ed.). See also TRAFFIC WORLD. Oct. 16,
1972, at 19-20.
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creasingly depends on other modes of intercity transportation,
leaving railroads insufficient traffic volume to justify existing ser-
vice levels. As early as the 1920's, the automobile accounted for
79.8 percent of all intercity passenger miles as compared with
15.5 percent for the passenger train.' 8 The development of air
transportation and the construction of the interstate highway sys-
tem aggravated the revenue drain from railroad passenger oper-
ations. By 1969, Class I railroads accounted for only 1.09 percent
of all intercity passenger miles while airlines and automobiles
accounted for 9.83 and 86.53 percent respectively.' 9 Com-
pounding the problem of a shrinking market is the necessity of
coping with continually increasing costs. In 1967 alone the cost of
providing the limited service then offered increased 20 percent
over the preceding year.20 In addition, passenger service pro-
viders have faced the erosion of peripheral service revenues, most
notably the loss of United States mail carriage. Since nearly
one-third of all revenues produced by passenger service were
derived from mail transportation contracts, the reduced avail-
ability of these contracts has significantly contributed to the un-
profitability of the passenger train.2' The impact of the passenger
deficit has been unquestionable. In 1929, approximately twenty
thousand passenger trains were being operated in the United
States; in 1970, the comparable figure was three hundred sixty.
22
During the period between 1920 and 1970, the United States
experienced a continuing contraction of rail passenger service in
the face of continually accumulating financial losses. By 1970 the
railroad industry's efforts to eliminate what was regarded as an
intolerable drain on its earnings had effected the near extinction of
the intercity passenger train.
18 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 806 (1970).
1984 ICC ANN. REP. 26 (1970). In this period 1958 through 1968, noncommutation
railroad passengers decreased 40 percent while first-class fare passengers declined by
nearly 70 percent. 82 ICC ANN. REP. 5 (1968).
2082 [CC ANN. REP. 5 (1968). One of the principal components of increasing cost is
labor expense. A recent study indicated that total labor costs per hour on duty for a
passenger train crew averaged 50 percent higher than those for an airline crew and 600
percent higher than those for an intercity motor bus driver. See Railroad Passenger Train
Deficit, 306 ICC 417, 436-43 (1959); 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 90-91
(statement of Anthony Haswell).
21 See 82 ICC ANN. REP. 5 (1968):
Mail revenues received by Class I railroads for passenger and freight
service in 1967 were $263.6 million, a drop of $40.4 million or 13.3 percent
below 1966. Express revenues declined 9.8 percent in 1967 to $60.7 million.
Decreases in Class I railroad mail and express revenues have been factors in
the reduction in intercity rail passenger operations.
Id. at 8.22Thorns, Amtrak: Rail Renaissance or Requiem?, 49 CHI-KENT L. REV. 29, 31 (1972).
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B. The International Experience
Although the techniques and theories of railroad operation vary
widely among industrialized countries, 23 the financial problem
associated with transportation of passengers by rail is nearly
universal. The passenger service problem in the United States is
not intrinsically different from that of other countries, but the
American remedial measures are distinctive. The fundamental
organizational difference between domestic and foreign railroads
is that the former are operated under a system of private manage-
ment while the latter are primarily government-owned and oper-
ated. Government financing and control is responsible for the
continued existence of an extensive grid of passenger train routes
throughout England, the Continent, and Japan.
24
Critics of American railroad passenger service note that the
United States has fallen behind other industrialized nations in
terms of the quality of service its rail carriers offer.25 Although the
passenger railroad systems of other countries continue to set the
standard for both quality and quantity of service, these systems
have not been immune from the operating deficits that compelled
contraction of American services. Indeed, nearly every nation-
alized railway system providing significant passenger services sus-
tains substantial annual deficits. 26 Compared to the $476.7 million
deficit of American Class I passenger carriers in 1970,27 the
nationalized railway systems of West Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Canada28 sustained operating losses of approximately $390 mil-
2 3See Allen. All Railroads Are Living In Glass Houses, TRAINS, Aug.. 197 1, at 20.
24
See generally G. ALLEN, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN (1961); M.
EINAUDI, M. BYE, & E. ROSSI, NATIONALIZATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY (1955); B.
LEWIS, BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION (1952); Coyne, The Board of Trans-
port Commissioners for Canada, 26 CAN. BAR REV. 950 (1948); Allen. supra note 23. at
20-22; The Case For- AndAgainst-Nationalization, TIME, JULY 20, 1970, at 59.
2 See, e.g., Thorns, supra note 22, at 31. See also 1968 Hearings, supra note 3, at
81-92 (statement of Anthony Haswell).
26
See Trzaskoma. Transportation Systems Criteria-Urban Corrider Rail Systems,
INTRASOCIETY CONFERENCE ON TRANSI'ORATION 28-39 (1972); Webb, The Rail Passen-
ger Problem in .astralia, 44 AUSTL. Q. 4 (1972); British Railways: Or How to Lose
Money at a Profit, FORBES, May 1, 197 1, at 23;Canadian National Cools on Riders, Bus.
WEEK, July 12. 1969. at 134; Debt Rides a German State-Run Railroad, Bus. WEEK, Jan.
23. 197 1. at 34; Japan's Troubled Railroads, Bus. WEEK, April 24. 197 1. at 38; Recession
Pats BR Back in the Red, RAILWAY GAZETTE INT'L,June, 1972, at 204.
27
See notes 9- 15 and accompanying text supra.
28 The Canadian situation is particularly interesting in that both major Canadian rail
carriers, government operated Canadian National and privately operated Canadian Pacific,
began an extensive program in the early 1960's to improve and promote their passenger
service. See Passenger Policies of the Canadian Railways, in S. Hollander. supra note 4,
at 3 16-25. Their experiment was intended to determine if intensive promotion by govern-
ment and private carriers could lure large numbers of people back to rail travel when the
service provided was of high caliber and attractive fare options were offered. The deficits
accumulated by both carriers as a result of providing such services indicate that the
[VOL. 7:155
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lion, $580 million, $500 million, and $7.8 million respectively. 29
Clearly the railroad passenger problem is not endemic to the
United States. The provision of such services materially contri-
butes to the operating losses sustained by nationalized rail carriers
of many countries. The carriers' financial reports indicate that
varied operating conditions and different systemic goals do not
significantly affect the proposition that transporting people by
railroad in the 1970's is generally not profitable. Most in-
dustrialized nations have accepted this proposition and have sub-
sidized the cost of rail passenger transportation where the service
is found to be necessary.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. 1958-1969
During the late fifties and throughout the sixties, Congress'
response to the railroad passenger problem was sporadic. By 1958
passenger service losses were threatening the financial integrity of
the railroad industry as a whole. The Transportation Act of
195830 was passed as a package of reform measures intended to
relieve the carriers from some of the more onerous federal regu-
lations.31 By adding Section 13a to the Interstate Commerce
experiment was less than successful. Canadian Pacific Railway reported a $30 million
passenger deficit in 1968 while Canadian National sustained a loss of $12 million for the
same period. The year 1968 was particularly significant because it marked a point when
the two railroads' efforts to extend and better passenger service had peaked, See FACTS ON
FILE, Nov. 20-26. 1969, at 763; 1969 Hearings, supra note 3. at 462-63. Government
subsidy legislation was required in 1967 to salvage a limited system of rail passenger
service. It allows subsidization up to 80 percent of the loss sustained over routes held to
be important and necessary. See 14- 15- 16 Eliz. 2. c. 69 (1966-67). See also McClaren,
The Passenger Train Rationalization Process, 10 W. ONT. L. REv. 103 (1971).
29 INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY STATISTICS 136 (1970). See 26 INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL STATISTICS at 75. 149, 203. 211 (1973) for the exchange rates used to convert local
currencies into American dollar figures.
The most recent figures indicate an increase rather than a leveling off of deficits. West
Germany's and Italy's nationalized rail systems each lost approximately $800 million in
1972. and Japanese National Railways projected a loss of $1.2 billion for fiscal year 1973.
U.S. NEws &WORLD REPORT, Feb. 19. 1973. at 83. However. it should be noted that the
enormous loss figures cited for Germany, Italy, and Japan are not solely the result of
extensive rail passenger operations. They represent operating losses incurred in freight
operations as well. To some extent. particularly in Germany and Japan. the railroads are
used by their governments for social ends aside from merely providing efficient tranporta-
tion. for example. dispersing population and relieving highway congestion. The large losses
these carriers sustain in furthering these policies might be regarded as costs the govern-
ment is willing to assume to effect a comprehensive social development plan. The Italian
railroad deficit is somewhat unique in that it seems to be the product of exempting nearly
all of the railroad's customers, whether passengers or shippers, from some portion of the
published relevant tariffs. See Allen, supra note 23, at 20-22.
3049 U.S.C. §§ 123 1-40 (1970).
31 See generally G. HILTON, supra note 3; Thorns. supra note 22. at 33.
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Act,3 2 the Transportation Act allowed carriers to abandon passen-
ger service operations more expeditiously and established a policy
favoring the elimination of much of the passenger rail service.
33
Section 13a precipitated a sharp decrease in the number of oper-
ating passenger trains.
When the impact of Section 13a on the number of passenger
trains operated became clear, Congress initially attempted to re-
peal it.34 After failing in this attempt, congressional approaches to
the problem alternated between measures designed to subsidize
carriers wishing to abandon unprofitable passenger service3 5 and
limitations imposed to make it increasingly difficult for railroads to
discontinue their existing passenger trains. 36 By 1969, when most
long-distance intercity service had been discontinued or was being
examined by the ICC to determine its future,3 7 the House Com-
3249 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
33 See Thorns. Regulation of Passenger Train Discontinuances, 22 J. PUB. L. 103,
103-08 (1973). The major change effected by Section 13a was the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction to the ICC with regard to hearing passenger train discontinuance petitions for
trains involved in interstate commerce. See 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1970). Previously a carrier
who wished to discontinue a passenger train was required to apply for permission from the
regulatory commission of each state through which the train passed. The new provision
gave the railroad the option of choosing either a local or national forum for trying its
service abandonment petitions. The companies generally chose to plead their cases before
the far more receptive ICC. See generally Conant. Railroad Service Discontinuances, 43
MINN. L. REv.275 (1958); Comment. Federal Supervision of Railroad Passenger Service,
1970 DUKE L.J. 529; Note. Criteria in Passenger Train Discontinuance Cases, 18
N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 127(1963).
During the period 1958- 1968, the number of intercity trains declined more than 60
percent, fourteen railroads abandoned all intercity service, and over 36 percent of the 1958
intercity routes were completely eliminated. 82 ICC ANN. REP. 5 (1968). The pace of
carriers passenger train divestiture is perhaps best examined by detailing the number of
discontinuance petitions filed with the ICC over the past several years together with the
Commission's response. Three hundred and sixty-seven notices to discontinue passenger
service were filed by Class I rail carriers over the period 1959- 1970. Seven hundred and
sixty-eight trains were permitted to be discontinued while 531 were ordered retained. Two
hundred and fifty-one petititions were dismissed or withdrawn. 84 ICC ANN. RE[,. 18
(1970). In August. 1958. 1.448 intercity passenger trains were in operation while a decade
later there were only 590. Slightly less than half of the 858 discontinued trains were
dropped by the ICC under authority of Section 13a. The remainder were abandoned by
authority of state regulatory commissions. 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 806 (1970). See ICC
ANN. REP. for 1967- 1971:1968 Hearings, supra note 3; 1969 Hearings, supra note 3.
34 The Passenger Train Service Act of 1960. S. 3020. 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See
1960 Hearings, supra note 3.35See, e.g., S. 325, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); S. 1289, 89th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1965).
See generally 1965 Hearings, supra note 3.
36 0ne leading proposal would have imposed a special pre-termination test. responsive to
carrier financial burden and public necessity and convenience, on any passenger trains
which represented the last remaining interstate rail service between two points. Included
was an amendment to Section 13a which would have authorized a study by the Secretary
of Transportation to determine the existing and future potential for intercity railroad
passenger service in the United States. S. 3861. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1968). Inasmuch as
such legislation would have delayed the processing of service abandonment petitions and
prolonged the drain on corporate revenues engendered by the continuation of unprofitable
service, the railroads strongly opposed it. See generally 1968 Hearings, supra note 3.
37 See notes 33- 34 supra.
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mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held a series of
hearings in which thirty-seven pieces of legislation dealing with
the problem were presented and considered.3 8 Although each of
these proposed acts represented a fragmented approach to the
complex problem, Congress recognized the need for com-
prehensive re-evaluation of the function of the passenger train in
the national transportation system. Before the year ended both the
House and Senate expressed their interest in a long-range plan
which would provide for coordination of all modes of intercity
passenger transportation. 9
B. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
In 1970 Congress passed, with little opposition,40 the Rail
Passenger Service Act 4' creating the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, a quasi-governmental entity charged with the re-
sponsibility of providing a basic system of nationwide railroad
passenger service. The continuing national need for rail passenger
transportation was recognized and Congress concluded that feder-
al financial assistance was the most expeditious and practical
means of meeting the need.42 The Act authorized the Secretary of
Transportation to designate a basic national rail passenger sys-
tem 43 over which trains were to be operated by the newly created
for-profit, quasi-public corporation 44 designated Amtrak.45 This
corporate entity is not an agency of the United States govern-
3 8See 1969 Hearings, supra note 3. These bills fell into four general categories: (1)
those amending Section 13a to make passenger train discontinuances more difficult or
prohibiting additional discontinuances altogether. H.R. 744. H.R. 785. H.R. 12084. H.R.
12841, H.R. 13020. H.R. 13236. H.R. 13299. H.R. 13347, H.R. 13610. and H.R. 13588.
91st Cong., lst Sess. (1969); (2) those specifically authorizing government agency studies.
H.R. 521, H.R. 6662. H.R. 11162. H.R. 14170, H. Con. Res. 17. H. Con. Res. 84. H.
Con. Res. 137, H. Con. Res. 143, and H. Con. Res. 297, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); (3)
those authorizing governmental agencies to set minimum comfort and safety standards on
intercity passenger trains. H.R. 3112, H.R. 9168. H.R. 13832, H.R. 13833, H.R. 13834,
H.R. 13852, H.R. 13919, H.R. 13920, H.R. 13938, H.R. 13981. H.R. 13994, H.R.
14214, and H.R. 14572, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); (4) and those authorizing the
appropriation of funds for the direct reimbursement of carrier losses sustained in providing
passenger service or modernization of equipment utilized in the service, H.R. 13352, H.R.
13366, H.R. 13377, and H.R. 14661,91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
39 See H.J. Res. 52,91stCong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2425.91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
40Thoms, supra note 22, at 34-36.
4145 U.S.C. §501 et seq. (1970).
4245 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
445 U.S.C. §§ 521-22 (1970).
4445 U.S.C. §541 (1970).
45 The Amtrak system was originally called Railpax. There were at least two reasons for
the change in name. A consulting firm determined that the name Railpax had relatively
poor consumer recall. and that such designation might lead to a suit for copyright in-
fringement by a company that had registered the name Railpak for a waste disposal
system. See Thorns, supra note 22, at 49; Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1971. at 24. col. 1.
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ment 46 but a "mixed ownership" corporation under the Govern-
ment Corporation Control Act.4 7 Fifteen directors are authorized
by statute-eight to be appointed by the President, three to be
elected by common stockholders, and four to be elected by hold-
ers of preferred stock. 48 In the enabling legislation, Congress
presumed that the corporation would eventually issue equity secu-
rities and appointed a panel to advise the directors on ways to
increase corporate capitalization. 49 However, Amtrak's imme-
diate funding was to come from federal grants and guaranteed
loans.
50
Congress authorized the corporation to "own, manage, operate,
or contract for the operation of intercity trains."-5 1 While Amtrak
has elected to purchase a fleet of passenger cars 52 and to purchase
or lease a number of locomotives, 53 it has decided not to use its
own employees to operate the trains. Instead, contracts for oper-
ation and maintenance were negotiated with the private carriers
who previously provided such services. These contracts require
Amtrak to pay each cooperating carrier an amount equal to the
"solely related expenses"' 54 incurred in operating Amtrak trains,
plus an incremental charge of 5 percent of this amount as a
contribution to the allocable costs55 chargeable to that service
and, originally, an additional 4 percent of "solely related ex-
penses" as a contribution to the liability insurance expenses borne
by the carrier.56 Railroads were permitted to participate in the
Amtrak system, thus obtaining relief from future passenger oper-
ations deficits, upon satisfaction of certain conditions. At the
railroad's option, it could pay, each year for three years, either an
amount equal to one-third of 50 percent of its fully-distributed
passenger service deficit in 1969, or 200 percent of its avoidable
loss during that year in all intercity service over routes designated
in Amtrak's basic system.5 7 Cognizant of the financial difficulties
4645 U.S.C. §541 (1970).
4731 U.S.C. § 856 (Supp. 1972).
4 45 U.S.C. § 543 (1970).
4945 U.S.C, §§ 581-83 (1970).
5045 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (1970). This act authorized a grant of $40 million to defray
start-up and operating expenses, and a federal guarantee of loans up to $100 million to
assist in making necessary capital expenditures for new equipment. The 1972 amendments
to the Act have increased the amount of funding to an additional $227 million in grants and
$200 million in guaranteed loans.
51 45 U.S.C. § 545 (1970).
52 See TRAINs, Dec., 197 1. at 16- 17.
53 
See TRAINS, Aug., 1972, at 13-15.
5 4 See note 15 supra.
55 Id.
5 6 See The National Railroad Passenger Agreement. art. 5. §§ 5.1. 7.2 in 1971 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 474. 482.
5745 U.S.C. § 561 (1970).
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which made the National Passenger Railroad Corporation neces-
sary, the enabling legislation provided a fund of $200 million for
use as a source of loans to carriers wishing to cooperate with
Amtrak but lacking the funds for the requisite cash con-
tributions. 58 Under the Act, Amtrak was also permitted to receive
equipment or future operating services from the carriers in lieu of
cash contributions. 59 In return for a contribution to Amtrak, the
railroad would receive, at its option, either Amtrak common stock
of equivalent par value to its payment, 60 or a tax deduction in the
amount of its contribution in the year in which the contribution
was made. 61 Of the twenty railroads electing to cooperate with
Amtrak by contracting to operate its trains, only four chose to
accept stock in return for their cash contributions. 62 If a carrier
refused to contract with Amtrak, it was required to continue
providing passenger service and was denied recourse to the ICC's
discontinuance-petition process until January 1, 1975.63
Amtrak officially began operations on May 1, 1971, and its
reception by the press, 64 the public, 65 and the courts was general-
ly favorable. However, a suit contesting the constitutionality of
the corporation's enabling legislation was immediately filed. 66 In
5845 U.S.C. §§ 621-22 (1970).
5945 U.S.C. § 561 (1970).6 0 d.
61 Pub. L. No. 91-518.84 Stat. 1341 § 901 (1970).
6 2 1CC, AMTRAK-STATE OF RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE 48-49 in 1971 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 588-89.
6345 U.S.C. § 564 (1970). Four major carriers elected not to contract with Amtrak and
to continue independent operation of passenger service. These are: Southern Railway.
Denver & Rio Grande Western; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific; and Georgia Railroad.
See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 550-5 I. See also Thorns, supra note 33, at
132, 148.
64
See generally, SATURDAY REV.. Jan. 15, 1972. at 26-28; U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, May 8. 1972, at 41-42. Feb. 28. 1971, at 50-54, Oct. 26, 1970. at 24. May 18,
1970, at 83; N.Y. Times. May I. 1971. at I, 34.
65 See note 17 supra.
6 6 Carriers considered filing suit against Amtrak. even before the corporation began
operations in early 1971. The railroads considered two legal arguments: first. that the very
act of signing a contract with the new corporation relieved them of their common carrier
responsibility to provide passenger service without imposing any subsequent duty to allow
Amtrak to use their facilities, and second, that Amtrak's intention to merely reimburse the
carriers for their losses without paying them a "profit" factor. in effect, deprived them of
their property without due process of law. See Thorns. Is Amtrak Legal?, TRAINS, Aug.,
1972. at 37. 39.
At least one commentator has tried to explain the railroads' reluctance to initiate legal
proceedings:
It has been surprising to some observers that an expropriation argument has
not been raised by the railroads. Failure to raise such an argument may be
because constitutional law has upheld uneconomic service requirements
when good public policy reasons have existed for requiring a public service
carrier to perform them. In the case of the Amtrak contracts, the price for
joining is generally what one would lose in a year in the passenger business.
Since a discontinuance proceeding may take close to a year and since the
legal fees incident to discontinuation of a particular train may exceed that
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Quincy College and Seminary Corp. v. Burlington Northern,
Inc.,6 7 a three-judge federal district court considered arguments
that the National Rail Passenger Service Act allowed the desig-
nation of a route system which arbitrarily discriminated against
rural communities in favor of metropolitan areas, and that Con-
gress, in allowing a private corporation to determine this system
of routes, had unconstitutionally delegated its authority. The court
rejected both these arguments in holding that the Act presented a
rational and fair plan to salvage what remained of intercity rail
passenger service and that Congress had provided sufficient stan-
dards to insure the legitimacy of its delegation. 68 With its integrity
as a legal entity assured, Amtrak began the practical task of
overseeing the management of a national rail passenger trans-
portation system. Like its common carrier predecessors, the cor-
poration found the undertaking expensive. For fiscal year 1972,
Amtrak's first full year of operation, it reported a net loss of
$143.5 million on revenues of $152.7 million.69
I1. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PRESENT
CONCEPT AND MANAGEMENT OF AMTRAK
Amtrak's organizational problems can be defined and analyzed
by considering three factors: the economics of rail passenger
transportation; the contractual relationship between the corpo-
ration and the participating private rail carriers; and the legal and
working relationship between Amtrak and the federal govern-
ment.70 Consistent with the experience of railroads in this coun-
train's losses for a year. payment of one year's passenger losses is not
necessarily exorbitent or an expropriation of property. In addition to being
relieved from the requirement of providing passenger service, the railroad
receives either stock in Amtrak or a tax deduction.
Thoms. supra note 33, at 135 (footnotes omitted).
67328 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 197 1),affd, 405 U.S. 906 (1972).
68 Id. at 810- I1 (1971).
69Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1972, at 31. col. 6 (midwest ed.).See MOODY'S TRANSP. NEWS
REP., Sept. 26. 1972. at 1469.
While demonstrating significantly improved on-time performance and increased rider
and revenue figures for the third and fourth quarters of 1972. Amtrak forecasted a deficit
of $ 128.4 million for fiscal year 1973. See TRAFFIC WORLD. Dec. 4. 1972. at 16: see also
TRAFFIC WORLD. Nov. 27. 1972. at 21. Oct. 2. 1972. at 74-75: TRAINS. Dec., 1972, at 3.
4. 6: N.Y. Times. Sept. 22. 1972, at 63. col. 2. Sept. 21. 1972. at 26. col. 2: Wall St. J..
Feb. 2. 1973. at 4. col. 3-4 (midwest ed.). Dec. 5. 1972. at 30, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
70See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 83-88 and 94- 102: 1971 House
Hearings, supra note 3. at 567-74. 596-604. and 714- 19: Haswell. Antrak-A Critical
Appraisal From The Viewpoint of the Consumer in 13 PROCEEDINGS TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH FORUM 113-29 (1972): Ross. A Critical Look at Amtrak in 13 PROCEEDINGS
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM 131-45 (1972); Wheeler, Amtrak: Economic As-
pects of Federal Railroading in 13 PROCEEDINGS TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM
147-62 (1972); TRAINS, Mar.. 1971 at 3. 4. and 6.
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try71 and abroad 72 the corporation has reported large losses on
passenger operations. 73 The fact that nearly all Amtrak routes,
over both long and short hauls, proved unprofitable in 1972.
74
indicates that the corporation's operating deficit may be chronic.
In view of these losses, the prospect of attracting private capital
to a rail passenger transportation company has been 75 and contin-
ues to be bleak.76 What was designed as a "for-profit," 77 "mixed
ownership,"' 78 corporation, has become a commercially nonviable
enterprise with only four corporate stockholders. 79 This situation
is dictated by the intractable nature of the economic problem
confronting the corporation.
Amtrak's financial difficulties are compounded by the uneasy
relationship between the corporation and the contracting railroads
which operate and service its trains. Despite assurances from
these carriers that they are doing everything possible to make
Amtrak successful, 80 the corporation has had to resort to the
courts or arbitration on numerous occasions to compel the rail-
roads to provide better service or to comply with some specific
condition of the contractual agreement."' The fairness of the
agreement has been challenged by critics. Some argue that con-
tract provisions which compel Amtrak to pay carriers their in-
71 See part I A supra.
72 See part I B supra.
73 Amtrak's financial situation is not healthy. The corporation reported an actual deficit
of $147.5 million for calendar year 1972 and a net loss for the first six months of 1973 of
nearly $63 million. See 1972 NAT'L R.R. PASSENGER CORP. ANN. REP., at iii (hereinafter
cited as 1972 NRPC ANN. REP.). With respect to expenses solely related to routes
serviced, the corporation reported a net loss for every route but one, and this one route's
small "profit" ($200.000) resulted because two-thirds of the cost of providing service over
it is paid by the state of Illinois in accordance with 45 U.S.C. § 563 (1970). See 1972
NRPC ANN. REP., supra at 4. II. Amtrak clearly expects no short-term solution to its
difficulties inasmuch as it has projected a deficit for the fiscal year ending June 30. 1973 of
$128.4 million, and a net cash operating deficit for fiscal year 1974 of $95.6 million. 1972
NRPC ANN. REP., supra at 4; Hearings on H.R. 835 Before the Subcomm. of Trans-
portation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
93d Cong., Ist Sess.. ser. 93-22. at 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
74
See 1972 NRPC ANN. REP.. supra note 73. at 4.
71 Within six months of Amtrak's initiation of operations, the ICC, in its report, AM-
TRAK- STATE OF RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE, noted:
The future financial needs of Amtrak will almost certainly have to be met by
direct government funding and by loans backed by government guarantees.
Private investors are most unlikely to be willing to subscribe to Amtrak's
equity securities, nor is there likely to be a market for its debt securities
unless they are fully backed by government guarantees.
1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3. at 553.
76 Thoms. supra note 22. at 39.
7745 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
7831 U.S.C. § 856 (Supp. 1972).
7 See note 62 supra.
8oSee generally 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3.
81 See 1972 NRPC ANN. REP., supra note 73. at 32-48.
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dependently determined costs plus a constant percentage of this
amount as a contribution to avoidable costs8 2 incurred83 act as a
disincentive to competent and efficient performance by encour-
aging the railroads to exaggerate service costs.8 4 Contracting rail-
roads, particularly the Penn Central Transportation Company,
contend that the present scheme of reimbursement seriously un-
dercompensates them because reimbursement is not based on the
fully allocable cost method.8 5 A reversion to allocable cost ac-
counting for the computation of Amtrak's carrier reimbursements
would cause a substantial increase in payments and presumably
enlarge the corporation's deficit as well.
Monetary costs aside, the single most important issue is pas-
senger service quality. Amtrak carrier contracts do not demand
adherence to a guaranteed performance standard. Further, there
are no applicable penalties to deter poor performance.8 6 There-
fore, Amtrak is largely dependent upon voluntary railroad cooper-
ation in providing clean, courteous, and on-time performance. If
customer mail is an accurate index of performance quality, carrier
efforts have been less than successful.8 7 One of the most critical
deficiencies has been a relatively poor schedule-keeping record.,
During 1972, on-time performance for all of Amtrak's 1,326
weekly trains averaged approximately 75 percent.89 Although
various causes have been identified,90 the principal responsibility
82 See note 15 supra.
83 National Railroad Passenger Agreement. 1971 Senate Hearings. supra note 3. at 474.
84See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3. at 89-90 (statement of Anthony
Haswell); 1971 House Hearings., supra note 3. at 570.
a1 See note 15 supra. See also 1973 Hearings. supra note 73, at 13- 14 (statement of
Roger Lewis).
86 See The National Railroad Passenger Agreement in 1971 Senate Hearings..upra
note 3. at 456-526. See also N.Y. Times. May 3. 1972, at 46, col. 1.
87 Of the consumer mail received by Amtrak from February through December. 1972.
58.9 percent was critical of service quality, complaining of rude personnel, equipment
malfunctions. and late arrivals. See 1972 NRPC ANN. REP.. supra note 73, at 24-25.
88 The problem of late train arrivals has been the subject of comparative and analytical
study. Results indicate that Amtrak's times are slower than established records in nearly
every case. See TRAINS. June. 1972. at 40. The Department of Transportation in its
Report to Congress on the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. found that for the first
eleven months of 1972 short haul routes averaged 82 percent on-time performance while
long haul routes over the same period averaged only 53 percent. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE ACT OF 1970, at 22 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as DOT REPORT].
89 1972 NRPC ANN. REP.. supra note 73. at 6 and Tables III-V. at 7-9.
90The Department of Transportation lists "slow orders". i.e., delays due to bad track or
roadbed, as the principal cause of Amtrak's poor on-time record. Delays due to in-station
equipment servicing and freight train interference are apparently of relatively minor signifi-
cance. See DOT REP., supra note 88. at 28. In contrast, the National Association of
Railroad Passengers (NARP) views station servicing and freight train interference as
major causes of delay and consequently blames both railroad uncooperativeness and
Amtrak complicity for the worsening on-time record. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 73. at
259. 265 (statement of Anthony Haswell). The statement also provides data regarding
on-time arrivals of Amtrak trains for the first quarter of 1973 and concludes that the
situation is worsening. See 1973 Hearings. supra note 73, at 252.
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for service delays rests with the contracting railroads that operate
the trains.
While Amtrak is not "an agency or establishment of the United
States Government," 9' dependence on governmental subsidies
has compelled it to conduct operations as if it were a public
agency. The level of government funding 92 has been criticized as
inadequate to meet Amtrak's needs and to provide a fair test of its
potential for success. 93 The manner of fund disbursement has
aggravated the problem of insufficient funding. The fund dis-
bursement method used is the traditional annual congressional
appropriation for each fiscal year.94 Because funds are appro-
priated on a short-term and uncertain basis, it is difficult for
Amtrak to plan efficient programs for route expansion or curtail-
ment, equipment acquisition, pricing, and general capital ex-
penditures. Amtrak's enabling legislation specifically makes it
subject to the provisions of the Government Corporation Control
Act 95 and gives the Comptroller General broad authority to audit
and verify its accounts. 96 Such financial control further inhibits
the corporation's ability to respond quickly to varying market
conditions. Though Amtrak's penetration of the travel market is
estimated at only 4 percent of the total traffic offering, 97 there are
indications that governmental financial controls are increasing.98
Subtle, yet significant, political influence on the corporation has
grown out of Amtrak's present relationship with the government.
It may be beneficial for a service organization dependent upon tax
monies for its existence to be subject to some political pressure.
Political input may engender a more democratically responsive
relationship between the corporation and its financial supporters,
both consumer and taxpayer. However, in Amtrak's case, evi-
dence suggests that political influences have had a less than con-
structive effect. Congress has exercised its power to induce the
corporation to establish unwarranted special services, 99 while fail-
9145 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
92See45 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (1970).
93 SeeThoms, supra note 22, at 43-44. See generally 1971 Senate Hearings and 1971
House Hearings, supra note 6.94 See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings and 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3: 1973
Hearings, supra note 73.
95 31 U.S.C. § 856 (Supp. 1972).
9845 U.S.C. § 644 (1970).
97 See A Survey of the Public Mandate for the Current Passenger Market and the
Potential Market for Intercity Rail Passenger Travel in the United States. conducted by
Louis Harris & Associates. Inc.. June. 1972. at 4.
98 See MODERN RAILROADS/RAPID TRANSIT. Jan., 1973. at 3 1.
99 The most notorious example of this conduct resulted in train service between Wash-
ington. D.C. and Parkersburg. W. Va. Although the route had a geographically undulating
profile unsuited to high speed/low tare equipment. Amtrak employed an expensive Turbo-
train which, in some circles came to be known as the "Harley Staggers Special" named
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ing to insure that these services were adequately funded. 100
Influence has been applied to reroute trains or to prevent their
rerouting for noneconomic reasons, 10 1 to reprimand obliquely the
corporation's top-level management,' 0 2 and to alter on-board train
regulations. 10 3 The exact impact of such political activity on Am-
trak's operational and financial performance is difficult to assess.
However, in a business where strict cost control and efficient
customer service are essential to survival, extrinsic influences
which subordinate these goals to partisan political advantage can
have only an adverse effect.
IV. THE BRITISH SYSTEM
A. The Transport Acts of 1947, 1953, and 1962
Because of the complicated administrative structure of the
transportation industry in Great Britain, British railroad passenger
service cannot be discussed without placing it in the context of
the governmental structure that manages the overall operations of
British rail carriers. British railways, like those in most other
industrialized countries, have long been subject to some degree of
governmental regulation. 10 4 Before the general conversion of Brit-
ish industry from private to public management in the late 1940's,
the government exercised significant control over certain trans-
portation industries10 5 by means of the public corporation. 0 6 Pub-
lic control on a national scale did not occur until enactment of the
after the Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Passenger
levels proved so low that the service was discontinued on May 5. 1973. See TRAFFIC
WORLD, Apr. 16, 1973, at 29.
100 E.g., service planned for Chicago to Spokane. Oakland to Bakersfield, and St. Louis
to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. See 1972 NRPC ANN. REP., supra note 73. at 2-4; Chicago
Sun-Times, Jan. 3, 1973, at 10, cols. 1-2.
101 Plans to expedite the Chicago-Miami seivice by changing its route were abandoned
because it was politically desirable, if not operationally efficient, to keep the train on its
present route. Amtrak would have tailored its Mexican service to fit political rather than
terrestrial geography if the railroads which were to provide the service did not, in effect,
veto the proposal-in one case by tearing down a station the day after an Amtrak
inspection team had viewed it. Chicago Sun-Times. Jan. 3, 1973. at 10. cols. 1-2.
102 The 1972 amendments to the National Railroad Passenger Act somewhat arbitrarily
reduced the salary of the president of Amtrak from $125,000 to $60,000. 45 U.S.C.
§ 543(d) (1972).
103 A written complaint by the Chief Justice of the United States to the Secretary of
Transportation about pipe and cigar smoking in certain "Metroclub" cars was sufficient to
cause the prohibition of such activities in late 1972. TRAINS, Feb., 1973, at 9.
104 See generally J. MORRISON, THE INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH RAILWAY LEGISLATION
(1848); H. KIDD, A NEW ERA FOR BRITISH RAILWAYS (1929); H. PERRIS, GOVERNMENT
AND THE RAILWAYS (1965).
105 See PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN
GREAT BRITAIN 155-208 (W. Robson ed. 1937).
106 See generally L. GORDON, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1938).
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Transport Act of 1947.107 The Act, like many other statutory
plans promoting the "nationalization" of British industries,' 08 util-
ized the public corporation as a means of unifying disparate pri-
vate enterprises into a single public organization. The public cor-
poration was designed to eliminate repetitive operations, thus
enhancing economic efficiency.
After the Second World War, railways were particularly in
need of corporate restructuring. 109 The Act of 1947 accomplished
this reorganization by establishing a public corporation with two
primary components: a policy-making unit to integrate different
modes of transportation and a series of administrative bureaus to
manage specific transport operations. The first unit was the Brit-
ish Transport Commission whose members were appointed by the
Minister of Transport. The Commission was responsible for all
modes of internal public transportation with the exception of
coastal shipping.110 In effect, the Commission performed the func-
tion of a super board of directors, replacing the boards of each of
the private companies whose operations it directed."' Trans-
portation service administrative units, called Executives, replaced
the upper level management teams of the previously private-
ly operated companies. 112
Under the 1947 Act, railways were managed by a hierarchical
structure that insulated routine service supervision from political
interference while maintaining political input to the organization's
policy-making division. The British Transport Commission, as a
public corporation, was not an agent of the Crown or a govern-
mental department. 113 The Commission was designed to operate
much like a private corporation: its administrative personnel were
not subject to civil service regulation; its financing was not a part
of the regular national budget and therefore was not subject to
annual alterations; it could issue stock, subject to Treasury ap-
proval; it could negotiate independently with whatever labor or-
ganizations it chose; and it could, subject to some limitations,
107 Transport Act of 1947. 10 & II Geo. 6. c. 49.
108 See generally G. ALLEN. THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (1961): D. BURN.
THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (1958): W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY
AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP (1960); W. ROBSON. PROBLEMS OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY
(1952).
"See R. JOHNSTON, BRITISH RAILWAYS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY H- 119 (1949).
See also C. Foster, THE TRANSPORT PROBLEM (1963).
11Transport Act of 1947. 10 & I I Geo. 6. c. 49. See A. PEARSON. THE RAILWAYS AND
THE NATION 59 (1964).
"'See Schmitthoff, The Nationalization of Basic Industries in Great Britain, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 557 (1951).
112 Transport Act of 1947. 10 & I I Geo. 6. c. 49.
'Transport Act of 1947, 10 & I I Geo. 6. c. 49.
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establish its own pricing policies. 1 14 As an independent entity, the
Commission was subject to national and local taxation or
levies.'1 5 While not directly subject to Parliamentary control, all
policy decisions could be vetoed by the Minister of Transport
who was responsible to Parliament. 116 Through this veto mech-
anism, national transportation policy could influence Commission
activities in a political way without inhibiting the Commission's
freedom to develop specific implementation measures. The Exec-
utives, which were responsible to the Commission and which
supervised the day-to-day operations of their respective modes of
transportation services, were even further removed from direct
Parliamentary control. The Railway Executive adopted a "func-
tional system" of organization, that is, a rigid system of depart-
mental control with a centralized decision-making bureaucracy."
l 7
Revenues exceeded costs for those years in which nationalized
carrier passenger service was operated under the direction of the
original Railway Executive."
8
The principal organizational devices developed by the Trans-
port Act of 1947, the Executives and the Transport Commission,
were later abolished; the former, under the authority granted by
the Transport Act of 1953,1 9 and the latter, under the Transport
Act of 1962.120 However, the essence of the 1947 Act remained:
an organization, separate from the government, invested with
government-like powers to set transportation policy and enter-
prise-like freedom to execute it. In allowing the Minister of Trans-
port to eliminate the Executives,' 21 the 1953 Act attempted to
accomplish two objectives: first, to concentrate control over ma-
jor capital and cost expenditures in one administrative unit; sec-
ond, to decentralize the management of railway operations
throughout several regional divisions. The financial control over
railways, which previously rested in the Executive, was trans-
ferred to the Commission. The Commission's operational respon-
sibilities were delegated to new area authorities headed by region-
al managers.1 22 The 1962 Act replaced the Transport Commission
1
14 See Robson. The Public Corporation in Britain Today, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1321.
1329-42 (1950).
115 Transport Act of 1947, 10 & I I Geo. 6, c. 49, § 10.
116 See Robson. supra note 114. at 1325-26.
117 For a more complete discussion of the organization of the Executives seeA. PEAR-
SON, supra note 110. at 63-64. See also H. CLEGG & T. CHESTER. THE FUTURE OF
NATIONALIZATION 108- 19 (1953).
:is A. PEARSON, supra note 110. at 65-66.
119 Transport Act of 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2. c. 13.
12 Transport Act of 1962. 10 & I I Eliz. 2. c. 46.
121 Transport Act of 1953. 1 & 2 Eliz. 2. c. 13, § 25.
122 A. PEARSON, supra note 110, at 73-75. 76-87.
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with several Boards each of which was responsible for a specific
transportation mode. 123 The Railways Board took over the role of
financial controller, previously exercised by the Commission, and
delegated further managerial responsibilities to the regional public
authorities.
12 4
During the period from 1953 to 1967, responsibility for railway
services shifted to the regional level. It was also during this period
that service costs began to create regular and substantial defi-
cits.12
5
B. The Transport Act of 1968
Several of the most important innovations introduced by the
Transport Act of 1968126 related to railway passenger service
operations. The Act authorized the Minister of Transport to des-
ignate Passenger Transport Areas. 127 Each area constituted a
geographical unit in which all transportation services were to be
integrated in an effort to minimize wasteful duplication of ser-
vices, reduce costs, and allow accommodation of the particular
transportation requirements of the local population. The area ad-
ministrative structure was similar to that created by the 1953 and
1962 Transport Acts.' 28 In each area, a Passenger Transport
Authority and an Executive were established. 29 The Authority
functioned as a policy-making unit which coordinated different
transportation modes and schedules, set rates, and determined the
quantity and quality of transportation service required in its par-
ticular area.' 30 The Executive was given responsibility for carry-
ing out Authority policies by providing the required service, or by
making service arrangements with the appropriate nationalized
carrier, including the Railways Board.' 3 ' This administrative
structure is conducive to provision of a balanced transportation
system tailored to local needs. Furthermore, the national trans-
portation system becomes more efficient because it can utilize
large public corporation carriers operating over a coordinated grid
of routes.
In financial matters, both the Executive and the Authority have
123 Transport Act of 1962, 10 & I I Eliz. 2, c. 46. § 1.
124 Id. §§ 2-6. See also A. PEARSON, supra note 110. at 88- 100.
12'See BRITISH TRANSPORT COMM. AND BRIT. RY. BD. ANN. REP. 1954- 1967.
126 Transport Act 1968. c. 73.
127 Transport Act 1968. c. 73. § 9.128 See notes 119-24 and accompanying text supra.
129 Transport Act 1968. c. 73. § 9.
110 Transport Act 1968. c. 73. § 10.
131 Id.
FALL 19731
Journal of Law Reform
the statutorily defined obligation to see that, to the fullest extent
possible, revenues cover operating costs. 13 2 Once satisfied of an
existing need, the Authority, if it agrees to provide the necessary
funding, may authorize implementation of a particular passenger
service notwithstanding the Executive's refusal to sanction such
service because of projections that costs incurred will exceed
revenues obtained. 133 Thus, the costs of an unrenumerative ser-
vice are not charged against the Executive operating budget and,
therefore, do not distort cost figures of services which are poten-
tially profitable or maintainable without a deficit. In this way, the
Executive's true efficiency can be more accurately analyzed.
The Act applies this same funding concept to the provision of
passenger service for the entire nation. 134 If a regional Authority
determines that a particular rail passenger route is necessary, it
can request the Railways Board to provide such service even if
the route would be unprofitable. However, the Railways Board is
generally obligated to discontinue or deny applications for ser-
vices which cannot be provided at a profit or at cost. 135 The
decision as to whether the service will be provided is made by the
Minister of Transport 136 after evaluating cost figures presented by
the Railways Board and public necessity arguments presented by
the regional Authority. If the Minister decides that the service is
necessary, despite its financially unremunerative prospects, he
may authorize a specific government subsidy covering the costs of
that particular service. Two features of the subsidy are notable.
First, it is designed to cover a wide range of costs associated with
the provision of a particular service. Included, in addition to
out-of-pocket expenditures, are allocable costs such as a deprecia-
tion charge on rolling stock, a contribution to maintenance-
of-way, and an amount for management expenses. Second, the
subsidy is a fixed grant calculated to cover all costs for a specified
period, not to exceed three years, and it is not subject to review
until the expiration of that period.' 37 This latter characteristic
builds efficiency into the administrative funding process. The Rail-
ways Board cannot furnish less service than the Authority has
requested because the minimum service level is stipulated in the
subsidy pertaining to that service. Yet, because the subsidy is
provided for an unreviewable period, service revenue increments
1
3 2 Transport Act 1968. c. 73, §§ 1I1, 15(3), 41(2).
133 Transport Act 1968. c. 73, § 15(3).
134 Transport Act 1968, c. 73, § 39.
135 See Allen. supra note 23, at 23.
136 Transport Act 1968, c. 73, § 39(1).
137 Transport Act 1968, c. 73, §§ 39-40.
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in excess of projected levels will innure to the Board's benefit.
The Board thus has an incentive to promote public service and to
operate as efficiently as possible.' 38 Under this funding plan, the
Board received approximately $150 million in subsidies during
1971 to subsidize unremunerative but socially desirable rail pas-
senger service.'
39
Although the 1968 Act has drawn criticism, 40 its general effect
has been to increase the amount of rail passenger service and to
improve the general quality of the service. The Act has resulted in
the gradual conversion of British Rail into a passenger-dominated
railroad. In 1971, the system carried nearly 823 million passen-
gers and accounted for approximately 15 percent of total traffic on
domestic trips of over a hundred miles.' 4 ' Despite the impact of
an improved highway system and increased public use of the
automobile, the railway system has been recovering passengers at
a rate of 5 percent per year.142 In 1971, passenger revenues
accounted for 54 percent of British Rail's total receipts.' 4 3 Al-
though the factors responsible for this resurgence are not easily
defined, the traffic growth seems primarily due to improvements in
speed and service.'
44
While the British system is viable, it is not perfect. In 1971,
direct government subsidies for uneconomic passenger service
amounted to over 20 percent of British Rail's passenger revenues.
Even with this additional funding, the system incurred an overall
deficit of over $35 million in that year. 1 The British experience
has been that efficiently provided rail passenger service can at-
tract substantial traffic. The system has also demonstrated that
such service cannot be provided unless the government bears
some of the economic costs. Although the British passenger rail-
way system still confronts difficulties, 4 6 it has managed to pro-
138 See Allen, supra note 23. at 23-24.
139 See 1971 BRITISH Ry. BD. ANN. REP. AND ACCOUNTS. The relevant figure is 63.1
million. Id. at 7.
140 See, e.g., British Railways: Or How to Lose Money at a Profit, FORBES, May 1,
1971,
141 Trzaskoma, supra note 26, at 32.
142 Id.
143 1971 BRITISH Ry. BD. ANN. REP. AND ACCOUNTS, at 7.
1
44
Trzaskoma. supra note 26, at 32. See also Bellwood. The Implications for Rail
Transport, 32 INSTITUTE OF TRANSP. 15-21 (1968); Jones, The Performance of British
Railways 1962-1968, 4 J. OF TRANSP. ECON. AND POLICY 162- 170 (1970); Could Mr.
Lang Be Wrong? TRAINS, Dec.. 1968, at 3. 4, 13.
145 1971 BRITISH Ry. BD. ANN. REP. AND ACCOUNTS 1971, at 7. 110.
146 It should be noted that recent shifts in nationalized transportation policy throughout
Europe and Britain have encouraged steps to "put the railways on a more strictly com-
mercial footing and to reduce their public service obligations." See SEVENTEENTH ANN.
REP. AND RES. OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 28 (1970). In Britain particularly. because
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vide an attractive service which meets the needs of local areas
while equitably distributing operational costs.
V. A NEW MODEL
The geographic and economic operating conditions of British
railroads are quite different from those of American railroads.
147
Thus, while the British approach to the rail passenger problem has
been useful and constructive, it cannot and should not be applied
without modification to the unique problems inherent in the
American railroad transportation system. However, the British
system embodies two concepts of general applicability which have
features well-suited to Amtrak's difficulties-the public corpo-
ration1 48 and the regional authority.149 If the public's perceived
need of an efficient and modern American rail passenger system is
to be met,' 50 an organization that can provide the desired service
of rising costs, there have been proposals to radically curtail rail service of all types. In a
government study entitled Rail Policy Review a number of drastic measures are proposed.
For example, a reduction of track from 11,700 to 7,000 or perhaps 3,000 miles; the
elimination of 123 of the 200 presently subsidized passenger services; and the contraction
of the daily system-wide traffic load by 250,000 passengers and 180,000 tons of freight. If
the report's conclusions are curt the reasons for them are certainly not cryptic. The 1972
deficit for all rail services is currently estimated at $90 million, projected to be $160
million in 1973, and over $230 million by 1976. The Times (London), Oct. 8, 1972. at 1,
col. 7.
147 See Hearings on British Railways: Advanced Passenger Service Technology, Before
the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., I st
Sess., at 2-3 (1971).
'
4 8 See part IV A supra.
149 See part IV B supra.It should be noted that the term "authority" as used by the
British statutes does not have the same technical significance it has in American usage.
One commentator has noted:
In British usage the term 'public authority' has an entirely different con-
notation, being a generic term applied to local governmental organizations,
agencies, officials, and their anonymous implementors, Cities, boroughs,
towns, villages, parishes, boards, commisions, and even local public corpo-
rations are often included in the term.
Tilden, Problems Underlying the Control of the Public Authority/Corporation, I NEW
ENG. L. REV. 85, 87 (1966).
15°The poll conducted by Louis Harris & Associates for Amtrak indicated that 73
percent of the public recognized that "along with airline, bus, and car travel, train travel
between cities is a very important part of America's transportation system;" 82 percent of
the public felt that "many people prefer to take a train for a pleasure or business trip, and
they should have the opportunity to travel this way;" 56 percent of the public considered a
policy of "developing fast, comfortable, intercity passenger trains" very important; and 54
percent thought a very important priority was "improving the quality and availability of
rail passenger travel for passengers on trips 300 miles or more one way." The poll noted
that 45 percent of the public feels that the federal government has a responsibility to see
that rail passenger service is maintained on routes between major cities and 53 percent of
the public believes that "the federal government has a responsibility to see that vital and
important passenger services are improved." Even more striking is the public's apparent
willingness to pay for such service in the form of federal subsidies. Sixty-nine percent of
those surveyed supported the idea of "federal assistance in providing railroads with loans
to buy new equipment;" 56 percent wanted "federal investment for fundamental changes
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must be designed with deference to established legal precedent
but without sacrificing the flexibility needed to meet the public
necessity.'- 1 Utilizing the two major concepts of the British
Transport Act of 1968, the proposed model posits an interacting
system of governmental entities that exploit the features of Amer-
ican federalism in order to meet a decentralized demand for rail
passenger service with a supply provided by an efficient, central-
ized unit.
In the proposed model, a public corporation assumes the oper-
ational and administrative responsibilities currently vested in the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation. The corporation would
own equipment and operate trains with its own employees, in-
cluding all on-board personnel. Major equipment maintenance
would be performed at the corporation's own repair facilities.
Except for providing routine maintefnance and inspection of cor-
porate equipment, private rail carriers would have no connection
with system operations. The corporation would compensate each
railroad whose route it uses and could expend its own funds on
facilities to improve safety and efficiency. Management would be
independent of other federal agencies or departments, but
long-range policy decisions would be subject to review by the
Secretary of Transportation.
Regional railroad passenger transportation agencies (RPTAs),
the model's second component, would serve to identify and chan-
nel regional demands for rail passenger service. Each of the sev-
eral RPTAs would consist of a number of contiguous states with
similar service needs. Each RPTA would have a policy-making
board composed of a single federal representative and two repre-
sentatives from each state in the region. The state representatives
would be appointed by the Governors of their respective states;
the federal representative would be selected by the Secretary of
Transportation. Each board would assess its area's need for rail
passenger transportation, construct a schedule of proposed routes,
in tracks and equipment that would improve train travel;" and 60 percent would back
major "federal investment to make American passenger train travel as good as any in the
world." When asked about the consequences of ending passenger train travel between
many cities because of deficits incurred on such routes, 72 percent of the public concluded
that such a reduction in service would certainly create "more harm than good." See A
Survey of the Public Mandate for the Current Passenger Market and the Potential Market
for Intercity Rail Passenger Travel in the United States, conducted by Louis Harris &
Associates, Inc., June, 1972, at 1-3.
151 It is generally unproductive to examine the concepts of public necessity or public
interest without reference to a particular set of facts. Public interest and need in this area
must be defined with respect to other factors of national and local significance. Without a
set of particular facts, any discussion of public need or interest in rail passenger service
must necessarily be inconclusive. See, e.g., 1969 Hearings, supra note 3, at 409- 10.
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and estimate the number of trains required to meet the projected
need. Each RPTA would have authority to consult with other
RPTAs to coordinate route assessments when consultations are
necessary or desirable. After determining its own service require-
ments, a regional agency may request the national public corpo-
ration to operate a sufficient number of trains to meet area de-
mands. Through the RPTAs, decisions about regional service
requirements are made, not by a centralized decision-making pro-
cess, but by individuals best able to estimate local needs.
If the public corporation, after reviewing the service request of
a regional agency, decides that it can provide the service either at
a profit or at cost, the service must be provided. However, if the
corporation determines that the service cannot be operated with-
out a financial deficit, the corporation may refuse to provide it.
Where service could be provided only at a loss, the regional
agency and the public corporation would present their respective
arguments before the ICC. The Commission would make its
determination on the strength of the regional agency's demonstra-
ted need. If it decides the service is necessary, the Commission
will calculate the probable deficit over a fixed period, not to
exceed three years. This deficit will be subsidized by the in-
dividual RPTA and the federal government on an equal basis
from funds established for this purpose. The required subsidy
would be supplied to the public corporation for a specific agreed
term. Fixing the subsidy over a given period serves to encourage
more efficient service. If, during the period, traffic volume should
increase in response to the provision of higher quality service, any
increment in revenue would inure to the corporation's benefit.
The applicable agreement would specify minimum service re-
quirements in order to inhibit deterioration of service. The model
thus provides for the creation of an organization with the in-
dependence and incentive to operate an efficient rail passenger
service system. The necessity for service will be determined by
those who will ultimately use it. The costs of providing unprofi-
table service will be equitably allocated between those who
directly benefit and the nation at large.
A. The Public Corporation
Under existing transportation requirements and economic reali-
ties, the public corporation is a governmental entity particularly
well-suited to deal with the rail passenger problem in the United
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States. Since its first non-eleemosynary application in the United
States,1 52 the public corporation has been recognized as an
efficient organizational form for dealing with situations in which
the public need for service is great, but attraction of private
capital is virtually impossible because of the absence of
profit-making possibilities.1 53 Given its past financial perform-
ance,' 4 Amtrak's current "mixed-ownership" status 55 is clearly
a fiction. It was apparent at the time of incorporation that the very
nature of the business undertaking would repel private investment
and ensure dependence on federal support in one form or another.
For that reason, at least one commentator suggested Amtrak be
initially organized as a public corporation. 56 The numerous dis-
advantages of a mixed-ownership form in an inherently unprofi-
table business 5 7 have spawned attempts to confront the problem
of unprofitable rail service which contain elements of a public
152 It is not a simple matter to define the first application of the public corporation form
of enterprise organization to a noncharitable institution in the United States. If the
amorphous category of public-utility type enterprises granted public charters by the federal
and state governments are put aside, the Panama Railroad Company, purchased by the
United States government in 1904, is the strongest candidate. See Abel, The Public
Corporation in the United States, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE 183 (W. FRIEDMANN & J.
GARNER eds. 1970). For a brief description of some early United States-owned public
corporations, see Culp, Creation of Government Corporations By The National Govern-
ment, 33 MICH. L. REV. 473. 473-86 (1935).
153 See Lilenthal & Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal
Government, 54 HARV. L. REV. 545, 552 (1941). See also Abel. supra note 152, at 184.
154 See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
155 31 U.S.C. § 856 (Supp. 1972).
156 R. W. Harbeson commented:
The possibility that the present arrangements may result in inadequate
financing, plus the likelihood that in any event the bulk of the financial
support will be provided by the government, suggest that NRPC might better
have been established as a strictly public corporation with full financial
responsibility for rehabilitating rail passenger service. After all, in the ab-
sence of government guarantees, it seems scarcely reasonable or prudent to
rely upon substantial private financial assistance for a venture in which the
most that can reasonably be expected is the avoidance of operating defi-
cits .... In general, it would have been simpler, more realistic, and more
conducive to accomplishing the goals of the present measure if NRPC had
been established as a public corporation.
Harbeson, The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 38 ICC PRAC. J. 330, 336-37 (1970)
(footnotes omitted).
157 One commentator has noted in this connection:
As a permanent arrangement, the mixed ownership enterprise appears to
afford few tangible advantages. [With a public corporation] [t]he government
does not have to rely on private investors to provide equity capital. Access
can be had to private money markets through the sale of revenue bonds
without sharing ownership. The purpose of a public enterprise is to accom-
plish a public purpose. Profits, if any. are incidental to the basic purpose. The
object of private enterprise is to earn a profit for the proprietors. A mixed
enterprise is likely to accomplish neither of these objectives very well.
Seidman. The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls, 14 Pus. AD. REV.
183. 191-92 (1954).
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corporation scheme. 158 Both commentators 5 9 and courts 60 have
recognized the advantages of an administrative entity which ex-
ercises power free of market and governmental pressures, while
retaining the flexibility and adaptability of a private enterprise.
Although "public corporation" has been variously defined, a
consistent definitional element has been complete or controlling
government ownership.' 61 In order to align corporate structure
and economic reality, the proposed entity must be made a "gov-
ernment corporation" as defined by the laws of the United States:
it must be a corporation owned or controlled by the federal
government.' 6 2 The ability of Congress to create public corpo-
rations, although not a specifically enumerated power, has been
consistently recognized since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.
63
The corporation's legal relationship to the states in which it
conducts operations is far less clear. It has been acknowledged
that a federal corporation is subject to the valid laws of the states
in which it operates insofar as these laws bear upon property and
business operations and to the extent that such laws do not
conflict with lawful federal control or interfere with governmental
15 8 A relatively early suggestion for a public corporation to provide rail passenger
service was made as one of a number of alternative proposals in the Doyle Report. a
report prepared for the Senate Commerce Committee in 1961: "A third possibility would
be to form a public (Federal) corporation in which the Federal Government would have
control and full operating responsibility." 1968 Hearings, supra note 3. at 129. A much
more recent attempt to solve the financial problems associated with rail freight trans-
portation in the northeastern United States makes use of a not-for-profit corporation which
would acquire and maintain designated rail lines. See S. 103 1. 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1973).
'
5 9 See Dimock, Principles Underlying Government-Owned Corporations, 13 PuB. AD.
REV. 51. 65-66 (1935); Dimock. Public Corporations and Business Enterprise, 14 PuB.
AD. REV. 417 (1936); Pinney. Government Commercial Corporations, I I U. CIN. L. REV.
481 (1937); Seidman. The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation: A Criti-
calAppraisal, 12 PUB. AD. REV. 89 (1952).
160See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.. 306 US. 381 (1939);
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).16 1See R. MARTIN, PUBLIC CORPORATIONS I-5 (1970); Thurston. Government Pro-
prietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REV. 351. 35 1-52 (1935).
1625 U.S.C. § 103(1)(1970).
16 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the power of the Congress to establish a
Bank of the United States). In its discussion of congressional power in the area of
government enterprise, the Court noted:
It is not, of itself, unconstitutional in Congress to create a corporation.
Corporations are but means. They are not ends and objects of government.
No government exists for the purpose of creating corporations as one of the
ends of its being. They are institutions established to effect certain beneficial
purposes; and, as means, take their character generally from their end and
object. They are civil or eleemosynary, public or private, according to the
object intended by their creation. They are common means, such as all
governments use .... Congress has duties to perform and powers to execute.
It has a right to the means by which these duties can be properly and most
usefully performed. and these powers executed,
17 U.S. at 325-26.
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functions.' 64 However, there is also authority holding that a state
law that substantially incapacitates a federal corporation and pre-
vents it from operating according to its congressional mandate
may be unconstitutional. 165 Since there is no federal law of corpo-
rations, a public corporation possesses only those powers which
Congress confers by specific legislative enactment.166 Clearly
Congress can use its powers to delimit the extent and character of
a public corporation's responsibilities for the purpose of insulating
that corporation from a number of state regulatory functions.
167
The decisions have not clearly defined the limits of this congres-
sional power in light of state attempts to control aspects of a
public corporation's operation that are not strictly an exercise of
constitutional power for a governmental purpose. The National
Rail Passenger Service Act exempts Amtrak from state legislation
that attempts to regulate rates, routes, and services pertaining to
the transportation of railroad passengers,' 6 8 but subsequent litiga-
tion has raised doubts about the adequacy of provisions for re-
moving a public corporation from all state regulation.' 69 In any
case, it is important that the model public corporation be given a
specific congressional exemption from any state control over op-
erations. Although the scope of the exemption will necessarily be
determined by the courts, it is evident that the exemption must be
16 4 See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford. 310 U.S. 41 (1940): Baltimore Nat'l Bank v.
State Tax Comm'n. 297 U.S. 209 (1936): Federal Land Bank v. Priddy. 295 U.S. 229
(1935); First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416 (1917); South Carolina v. United
States. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
165 See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.. 220 U.S. 107 (191 1); McClellan v. Chipman. 164 U.S.
347 (1896).166 See Seidman. supra note 159. at 93.
167 Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.. 308 U.S. 21 (1939): Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (192 ).
16845 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1970).
169 The litigation arose out of two "raids" by state officials in Oklahoma and Kansas in
the summer of 1972 on Amtrak trains. The raids were carried out to enforce laws in the
states which prohibited the sale of alcoholic liquor by the drink. See N.Y. Times. July 15.
1972. at 54. col. 2. See also N.Y. Times. Sept. 10. 1972. at 76. col. I. Amtrak instituted
legal action in both states asking for a permanent injunction against state officials to
prevent them from stopping trains and confiscating liquor served aboard them. Amtrak
contended that its enabling legislation established a comprehensive federal scheme of
regulation for intercity rail passenger service, including on-board food and beverage
service, thereby preempting state regulation. It argued further that the beverage service on
its interstate trains has such an insubstantial connection with the "health. welfare, morals.
safety and temperance" of the states' citizens that enforcement of "'open saloon" laws
against the trains violates the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The states
contended that Amtrak's liquor-serving practices aboard trains that crossed their borders
violated the twenty-first amendment.See Brief for Plaintiff, National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Harris, 354 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Okla. 1972). The federal district court in Oklahoma
agreed with Amtrak's position and granted the prayed-for permanent injunction. National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Harris. 354 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Okla.. (1972). See also Note. 6
CREIGHTON L. REV. 249 (1973). The federal district court in Kansas disagreed and refused
to grant Amtrak relief. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller. 358 F. Supp. 1321 (D.
Kan. 1973).
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given a broad interpretation if the corporation is to retain the
flexibility needed to provide efficient public service.
170
In order to exploit most fully the advantages of the public
corporation form, the model corporation must be given a clear
legislative mandate to carry on independent operations using its
own employees. Thus, the corporation would require a minimum
of "assistance" from those private carriers over whose lines it
operates. The issue of independent operation has been frequently
discussed. 171 Although Amtrak's enabling legislation, as amended,
exhorts the corporation to "directly operate and control all as-
pects of its rail passenger service,"' 172 and requires the Secretary
of Transportation to prepare recommendations as to how an in-
dependent operation might best be effected, 173 the corporation has
failed to place its own employees in a number of important posi-
tions. 17
4
Another important issue is the applicability of federal civil
service laws to employees of the corporation. The Ramspeck
Act 175 of 1940 makes the application of civil service requirements
to government-owned corporations a matter for Presidential dis-
cretion. Since rail passenger service demands innovative market-
ing and operating practices and emphasizes courteous and
efficient service, the rigidities of the civil service system make it
inferior to the system employed by private industry in which
promotion is based on merit. 76 The model public corporation
170 Perhaps what is needed is a grant of authority as broad as that given to the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), which the courts have found to be relatively free from state
regulation and control. See 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970). See also TVA v. Kinzer. 142 F.2d
833 (6th Cir. 1944); City of Middlesboro v. Kentucky Util. Co., 248 Ky. 833, 146 S.W.2d
48(1940).
17 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 84-85; 1973 Hearings, supra note 73, at
257-58; 1972 NRPC ANN. REP., supra note 73, at 19-23; DOT REP., supra note 88, at
58-66.
17245 U.S.C. § 545 (1972).
17345 U.S.C. § 645 (1972).
174 There is some controversy as to the extent Amtrak's own personnel should partici-
pate in the operation and staffing of its trains. The National Association of Railroad
Passengers has proposed legislation which would require the corporation to
directly employ all persons who issue, collect, handle, assign, or otherwise
control tickets, cash, receipts, and reserved space assignments, and all other
persons whose full-time occupation is solely related to the provision of
intercity passenger service provided by the Corporation.
1973 Hearings, supra note 73, at 281. On the other hand the Department of Trans-
portation believes that Amtrak has done all it can practically do to operate its trains with
its own employees and further attempts in this area might well be counterproductive. DOT
REP., supra note 88, at 58-66. It is nonetheless true that on-board train functions are
largely undertaken by employees of the private carriers. 1972 NRPC ANN. REP., supra
note 73, at 23.
1755 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1) (1970).
176 In discussions of the inherent advantages of a public corporation form of enterprise
organization, a number of commentators have singled out flexibility of personnel manage-
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must be exempted from civil service laws so that it can manage its
personnel practices with the same degree of freedom enjoyed by
private competitors supplying transportation services.'
77
Just as the model public corporation must be free of state
regulation and control if it is to use its inherent advantages most
effectively, it must also be free from some of the effects of the
Interstate Commerce Act.' 78 The National Rail Passenger Ser-
vice Act recognized the importance of this freedom and provided
that Amtrak, while generally regulated by the Interstate Com-
merce Act, would not be subject to the Act's provisions regarding
regulation of fares, abandonment of lines, or regulation of routes
and services.' 79 The Act did provide, however, that the ICC
would have jurisdiction over attempts by Amtrak to discontinue
trains after July 1, 1973,180 and gave the Commission authority to
prescribe regulations "as it considers necessary to provide safe
and adequate service, equipment, and facilities for intercity rail
passenger service."'' Neither of these ICC regulatory functions
should be applied to the rhodel public corporation. The model
corporation's relationship to the ICC should be such that the
Commission serves primarily as an accounting service, calculating
specific service costs after making policy decisions as to whether
federal financial support is warranted. The present law would
impose an intolerable burden on the public corporation since
considerable delays may be incurred before a service can be
discontinued. The delays would be necessitated by notice require-
ments,'1 2 and exhaustion of appeals. ICC decisions in dis-
continuance proceedings'83 may be appealed first to a three-judge
district court'8 4 and ultimately to the Supreme Court. 8 5 The
ment and freedom from the effect of civil service legislation as important to the corpo-
ration's success. See, e.g., Abel. supra note 152. at 193-94; Lilenthal & Marquis, supra
note 153, at 565-67.
177 The experience of TVA with respect to the civil service laws is instructive. TVA's
enabling legislation broadly exempts the Authority from the application of civil service
laws, at least as they bear upon the hiring and discharging of employees. 16 U.S.C. § 831 b.
The civil service laws themselves specifically exempt the Authority from complying with a
number of detailed provisions dealing with employee benefits. 5 U.S.C. §§ 305, 4102(a)
(l)(B), 4301(1)(1), 5533(d)(4), 5541(2) (viii), 5595(a)(2)(vii), 5596(c), 5911(2), 833 1(1) (vi),
and 8901(l)(iii). At least one commentator believes that the civil service exemption policy
is one reason for the Authority's acknowledged success. See C. PRITCHETT, THE TEN-
NESSEEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, A STUDY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 267-71. 305-09
(1942).
17849 U.S.C. § I etseq.(1972).
17945 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1970).
18045 U.S.C. § 564 (1970).
1145 U.S.C. § 641 (1970).
182 45 U.S.C. § 564 (1970).
18349 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
18429 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1398, 2284, 2321-25 (1972).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1972).
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public corporation must be allowed to discontinue any service it
determines cannot be provided without financial loss, upon giving
the public a thirty-day notice of such an intention. Unless a
regional passenger transportation agency expresses an intention to
assist in funding, the service should be discontinued at the end of
thirty days without the permission of or resort to any regulatory
agency, state or federal. Similarly, the ICC must not be allowed to
propose regulations pertaining to the character of the service
provided. To be successful, the corporation requires independent
decision-making about the kind of service that can best be market-
ed in any given area.
18 6
The model public corporation would be wholly govern-
ment-owned. Nearly every currently chartered corporation of this
type is subject to the Government Corporations Control Act.
187
The Act has been criticized 18 primarily because of the rather
strict control it imposes over the financial dealings of those gov-
ernment corporations to which it applies. The Act prescribes
accounting and auditing procedures which vest a great deal of
authority over corporate expenditures in the Bureau of the Budget
rather than in the corporations themselves.'8 9 One of the dis-
tinguishing components of any public corporation is its ability to
manage its own financial resources, regulating revenues by con-
trolling the number and character of service offerings while con-
trolling costs by varying spending for capital expenditures and
ordinary purchases. Auditing procedures designed to influence the
manner of expenditures, rather than trace and record patterns of
cash flow, impinge upon the independence of the public corpo-
ration. The public corporation needs independent control over
expenditures to carry out its public service functions efficiently
and to retain its identity as a corporate enterprise. The model
public corporation ought to be exempted from these sections of
the Government Corporation Control Act' 90 which would largely
relieve it of responsibility for its own financial management.
19'
186 It ought to be noted that the conclusions reached regarding the role of the ICC with
respect to the public corporation are not materially different than those reached by the
Department of Transportation's Report to the Congres. See DOT REPORr, supra note 88,
at 104-09.
18731 U.S.C. §§ 841-71 (Supp. 1972).
1 88See, e.g., Abel, supra note 152, at 197; Pritchett, The Government Corporation
Control Act of 1945,40 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 495, 502-09 (1946).
89 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 847, 849, and 850 (Supp. 1972).
190One section of the Act itself appears to provide Congress with the necessary
authority to circumvent the Act's more restrictive provisions. See 31 U.S.C. § 852 (1972).
191 TVA provides an example of a public corporation which has apparently benefited
from deliberate exemption from regulatory legislation. The impact of the Government
Corporation Control Act is extensively modified with respect to TVA. It is authorized to
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Regarding the structure of corporate funding, various schemes
have been devised to provide enterprise capital. The specifics of
the schemes depend upon the kind of activity performed and the
prospect of profitable operations. 192 The goal of the model public
corporation is to provide efficient service to the public, utilizing
the revenue derived to cover operating costs. Services which
produce losses would be subsidized and such subsidies should be
separate items in the corporation's budget. Long-term funding
would come from loans, principal and interest of which would be
subject to federal guarantees, and from the issuance of debt secu-
rities, the interest and redemption of which would be federally
secured. 193 Amtrak's current funding, dependent as it is on annual
appropriations, does not allow planning for a sensible program of
capital expenditures or projecting of a schedule of expanded oper-
ations.1 94 The public corporation must have access to a pool of
funds of known dimension and free of arbitrary curtailment, if it is
to provide the quality and quantity of service that is necessary in
light of established organizational goals.
Because a public corporation is a governmental entity, the
corporation's relationship to the government becomes important
in deciding which, if any, governmental immunities should be
extended to it. The issue of immunity from taxation is important
for both theoretical and practical reasons. The power of Congress
to grant tax exemptions to public corporations has never been
seriously challenged.' 95 However, the extent of a state's ability to
tax federal public corporations is an issue which has engendered a
good deal of discussion. 96 In those cases where Congress has not
specifically exempted public corporations from state taxation,
make expenditures and to enter into such contracts, agreements and arrangements upon
such terms and conditions and in such manner as it may deem necessary, including the
final settlement of all claims and litigation by or against it. Notwithstanding the provisions
of any other law governing the expenditure of public funds, the Government Accounting
Office in the settlement of accounts of the Treasurer or any other accountable officer of the
coporation cannot disallow credit for nor withhold funds because of any expenditure which
the Board of Directors determines to be necessary to carry out the provisions of the
corporation's enabling legislation. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 381h(b), 831h(a).192 See Lilenthal & Marquis, supra note 153, at 563-65, 586-95; Seidman, supra note
157. at 183-86.
'
9 3 The funding structure proposed is not unlike that of the TVA which has from its
beginnings been funded by three primary sources: its own revenues, appropriations from
Congress. and income from the issuance of its own bonds. See Abel, supra note 152, at
185; C. PRITCHETT, supra note 177, at 234-36.
194 The unsatisfactory nature of Amtrak's funding method has been critically examined.
At least one proposal calls for the corporation to receive an open-ended appropriation. i.e.,
one that would not be limited to any specific period of time. See DOT REPORT, supra note
88, at 109.
1 9 5 See Thurston. supra note 16 1, at 109.
196 See, e.g., Abel. supra note 152, at 197-98; Lilenthal & Marquis, supra note 153, at
596- 601; Thurston, supra note 16 1. at 475- 85.
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courts have allowed the states to tax real property held by the
corporation, but prohibited the taxing of revenues obtained from
the performance of governmental functions. 197 However, where
Congress has explicitly exempted public corporations from state
taxation, its power to do so has not been questioned. 19 Indeed
congressional power to preempt such state taxation has been so
widely recognized that most commentators assume Congress's
power in this area would have automatic application.' 99 The mod-
el public corporation should be exempted from all income and
property taxes. The corporation will be a genuine public service
enterprise performing an important transportation function. To
the extent that it relieves the states of the need to expend tax
monies on construction and operation of facilities for public trans-
portation, the corporation is making a contribution to their respec-
tive tax funds. Also, any imposition of a heavy tax burden on an
organization designed to be nonprofit can only make organ-
izational goals more difficult to achieve. In lieu of allowing the
states to tax the corporation, Congress can, as it has done in
similar situations,200 grant the states a percentage of the corpo-
ration's revenues earned within their respective jurisdictions. Al-
though this approach is not without problems, 201 it can remove
some political opposition to the formation of a public passenger
197 See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940): Union Pacific R.R. v.
City of Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5 (1873).
19sSee Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318 U.S. 357 (1943); Graves v. New
York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 US. 466 (1939).
199 The Doyle Report in discussing the advantages of a federal public corporation for rail
passenger service notes: "One of the advantages of a Federal corporation will be its strong
position in relation to State and local taxation," 1968 Hearings, supra note 3. at 129. In
his discussion of Amtrak's enabling legislation. R.W. Harbeson commented:
If NRPC had been established as a public corporation rail passenger service.
property contributed to the Corporation would have been removed from state
and local tax rolls. The necessity of reimbursing state and local governments
for the loss of tax revenue would consequently have become an issue.
Harbeson, supra note 156. at 337. n.9.
2
1
0 See 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1) (1970) which provides for a revenue reimbursement scheme
for TVA and the states in which it operates.
201 See Lilenthal & Marquis, supra note 153, at 600:
Again even though the activity is one which produces substantial revenues.
the proper measure of payments to be made to the states may or may not be
the amounts they would have received by way of taxes had the enterprises
been privately conducted. Against tax losses should be balanced, to some
extent at least, benefits which may result to the region through the federal
enterprise.... Further, it will be necessary to determine in particular in-
stances whether payments shall be made to state and local governments
during the whole life of the federal enterprise or only for a period of sufficient
duration to permit them to make necessary adjustments in their governmental
and tax structures.
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rail corporation while allowing the corporation to function without
incurring a crippling financial liability.
The susceptibility of a government-owned public corporation to
legal process and suit has not been a subject of controversy.
Although Congress has the power to grant immunity from suit to
a government corporation,20 2 this immunity does not automat-
ically attach to the corporation by virtue of its governmental
character.20 3 In fact, Congress has nearly always granted a waiver
of immunity to its public corporations, allowing them to sue and
be sued as a private business.20 4 The model public corporation
should be no exception. The protection afforded by the Federal
Tort Claims Act,2 0 5 which allows suit directly against the United
States under certain circumstances, is too restrictive to safeguard
the public interests affected by corporate operations. 20 6 To allow
the public corporation to defend its rights and accommodate those
of the public, it must be given the authority to bring suit in its own
name and made liable to suit as a corporate entity separate from
the federal government.
B. The Regional Passenger Transportation Agencies
The tension between the common carriers' responsibility to
provide public service and the unprofitable consequences has not
abated. In his original designation of a system of routes for Am-
trak trains, the Secretary of Transportation weighed heavily the
prospective financial viability of every route.20 7 Given the con-
gressional mandate of operating a "for-profit corporation,' 2 0 8 per-
haps no other approach was possible. Neither the states nor any
local or regional authorities or agencies had any formal role in
route designation despite their obvious interest. 209 The absence of
an organized procedure or reliable method for determining local
desires for rail passenger service, coupled with Amtrak's
profit-making directive, makes it understandable that Amtrak's
2
1
2 See Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
203 Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
204 See Abel, supra note 152, at 198-99; Thurston, supra note 161, at 372-9 1.
205 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
206 The example of the TVA is again instructive. TVA is specifically exempted from the
operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and has the authority both to sue and be sued in
its own corporate name. See 28 U.S.C.§ 2680(1) (1970) and 16 U.S.C. § 83 l(c) (1970).
207 See Final Report On Basic National Rail Passenger System in 1971 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 170-79.
20845 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
2
09 See Harbeson, supra note 156, at 337.
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management has continued a policy of reducing financially un-
remunerative services, 210 despite public protest.21
From Amtrak's inception the need for state as well as federal
subsidies was apparent, if the shrinking of service was to be
controlled. The National Rail Passenger Service Act provides
that any "state, regional, or local agency" may request service in
addition to that operated by Amtrak. 212 However, the Act also
requires a local governmental contribution of no less than
two-thirds of the service's costs less revenues. 21 3 Some com-
mentators have noted that, in light of the short-term dis-
continuance notice requirements imposed by the Act, 214 this cost
requirement is unfair, 215 and in some cases, alternative rates of
contribution have been suggested. 216 Present attempts to draw
complimentary local funds into Amtrak's operating budget have
proven largely unsuccessful. 217 The model regional passenger
transportation agencies, RPTAs, will reduce the financial burden
for the local governments in two ways: first, the RPTA is required
to contribute only one-half the losses incurred in providing the
service; second, the tax base for generating the needed revenues
would be spread over the several states comprising the RPTA. A
consensus acknowledging the necessity of a given route service
must be reached by a large number of people over a relatively
wide area. If such a consensus can be achieved, it is fairly certain
that there will be both a real need for rail passenger service and a
means of funding it not unduly burdensome to either the users or
the federal treasury.
Interstate compacts can form the legal basis for regional pas-
210 The Department of Transportation, presumably with the endorsement of Amtrak's
management, has recommended the abandonment of several long and short haul routes.
See DOT REP., supra note 88, at 79-98.
211 See NARP Proposals for Restructuring Amtrak Train Service Between Chicago and
Florida and Between the West and the Midwest, 1973 Hearings, supra note 73, at
297- 304. See also Thoms, supra note 33, at 108-31. indicating the railroad's historical
difficulties in discontinuing passenger trains and in abandoning the business of transporting
passengers because of public opposition which delayed discontinuance proceedings. Such
opposition was presumably based on the public's perceived need for service private rail
carriers could not afford to satisfy.
21245 U.S.C. § 563(b) (1970).
21345 U.S.C. § 563(c) (1970).
21445 U.S.C. § 564 (1970).
215 See Harbeson, supra note 156, at 337.
216See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 73, at 287. NARP proposes the Act be
amended to require a contribution of only one-third by the local governmental unit.
2 17 As of the end of 1972, Amtrak was operating three services partially funded by local
governments: (I) Boston-Worcester-Springfield; (2) Chicago-Galesburg-Quincy; and (3)
Philadelphia-Harrisburg. See 1972 NRPC ANN. REP., supra note 73, at I1- 12.
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senger transportation agencies. Compacts have been previously
suggested to Congress for the organization of specific regional
transportation authorities, 2 18 but the model proposes a na-
tion-wide system of compacts which would be closely coordinated
with a public corporation. The compact itself is a constitutionally
sanctioned device, 2 19 increasingly -employed by states with com-
mon problems. 220 Although historically limited to narrow uses,
2 21
it has achieved widespread application in a variety of situ-
ations. 22 2 All compacts share some characteristics, 2 23 but they can
be divided into those which require congressional consent and
those which do not. 224 Inasmuch as congressional consent is
required whenever the compact affects the balance of power with-
in the federal system, 225 such consent is required in nearly every
218 See, e.g., S. 348.89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) (consenting to the States of Massachu-
setts. Rhode Island, Connecticut. and New York negotiating and entering into a compact
to create their own Northeast Rail Authority): S. 1234, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)
(consenting to the States of New York and Connecticut negotiating and entering into a
compact to create their own New York-Connecticut Rail Authority): S. 924. 91st Cong.,
I st Sess. (1969) (consenting to the States negotiating and entering into compacts to create
their own regional inter-city rail passenger service authorities).
219 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10.22 00ne commentator reports that, "Between 1783 and 1920, the states entered into
thirty-six compacts. Between 1921 and 1955, they entered into sixty-five. Since 1955.
more than a score of additional compacts have been established... ". W. BARTON, IN-
TERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 3 (1967). See V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS 1783- 1966: A COMPILATION (1966).
221 See V. THURSBY. supra note 220. at 1-5. 23-66; F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL,
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINcE 1925, at 1-29 (1951); Frankfurter & Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J.
685 (1925).
222 At least ten different applications of the compact device have been made. They
include interstate agreements involving boundaries and cessions of territory, crime con-
trol, interstate accounting, uniform legislation, conservation and use of natural resources,
taxation, control and improvement of navigation, utility regulation, civil defense, and
regional education. See V. THURSBY, supra note 220. at 97- 135.
223 One commentator has noted six such characteristics:
I. It is formal and contractual. 2. It is an agreement between the states
themselves, similar in content, form, and wording to an international treaty.
and usually embodied in state law in an identifiable and separate document
called the 'compact.' 3. It is enacted in substantially identical words by the
legislature of each compacting state. 4. At least in certain cases, consent of
Congress must be obtained; in all cases. Congress may forbid the compact
by specific enactment. 5. It can be enforced by suit in the Supreme Court of
the United States if necessary. 6. It takes precedent over an ordinary state
statute.
F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL. supra note 221. at 42.
22 4
See M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 20-24
(1971); V. THURSBY. supra note 220, at 67-78: F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL. supra
note 22 1. at 37.
225 See V. THURSBY, supra note 220, at 75; F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL,supra note
221, at 34.
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case. 226 Since regional passenger transportation agencies would
have a significant impact on interestate commerce, consent will be
necessary. A blanket statutory grant of prior consent to all com-
pacts for RPTAs would be the most practical approach. This
procedure has been applied previously when Congress wanted to
promote interstate cooperation. 227 Although interstate compacts
have been criticized for removing the electorate from govern-
mental decision-making, 228 they provide an ideal legal mechanism
for binding states together to pool their resources to meet com-
mon local needs.
229
The model regional agencies themselves would be very similar
to many previous public authorities. 230 However, one significant
difference arises from the definition of a public authority. While
entities created by interstate compact have been referred to in-
terchangeably as authorities, commissions, administrations,
boards, and agencies, 23 ' the public authority proper has been
defined as "a limited legislative agency or instrumentality of cor-
porate form intended to accomplish specific purposes involving
long-range financing of certain public facilities without legally or
directly impinging upon the credit of the State.- 232 Public au-
thorities are generally considered self-supporting, 23 3  revenue-
producing 23 4 bodies financed by bond issues. 23 5 Given the pro-
posed function of the model RPTA, it cannot be a self-supporting,
revenue-producing entity. In this sense the RPTA is not a true
226 For a critical analysis of such requirement see Carman, Should the States Be
Permitted to Make Compacts Without the Consent of Congress?, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 280
(1938).
227 Consent in advance to the formation of interstate compacts has been granted, for
example. in the fields of forest protection. crime control, tobacco regulation, flood control,
and park and parkways preservation. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note
221. at 57-58.
228 See M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 224, at 308-09.
229 The Supreme Court has ensured the legal validity of the compact device in several
decisions which affirmed the Court's authority to enforce such agreements and to pass
upon their meaning and legality. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22
(1951): Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503 (1893).
230 For a detailed and thorough discussion of the concept of the public authority and its
practical implementation in the United States and abroad see the collection of articles in
26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (1961).
231 See R. LEACH & R. SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 62
(1959).
232 Gerrig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 591
(1961).
233 A. TOBIN, AUTHORITIES AS A GOVERNMENTAL TECHNIQUE 15 (1953).
23
4 See R. SMITH. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
21 (1964).235 See Gerrig. supra note 232, at 600.
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public authority, but rather is a public agency with responsibility
for making local policy decisions regarding regional requirements
for intercity rail passenger service and apportioning the costs of
the service among its member states. However, the flexibility of
this governmental instrument does not preclude the possibility of
gradually allowing the agency to assume greater responsibilities
for transportation services. 23 6 If these responsibilities grow to
include intraregional mass transportation systems, a conversion to
the public authority form of organization, with its reliance on
bonded debt financing, might be justified economically. The re-
gional passenger transportation agency can meet the current need
for a system to provide necessary passenger rail service and to
apportion the costs. The RPTA can also meet the future need for
more coordinated and efficient satisfaction of growing local trans-
portation demands.
VI. CONCLUSION
The industrial revolution made the railroads and passenger
trains possible, and rapid national growth made them practical. At
the present stage in the evolution of these social processes, the
passenger train is in a paradoxical situation: while some elements
of society demand its continuance, the same society cannot gener-
ate the private capital required to sustain it. This phenomenon is
not endemic to any one nation; it characterizes a development in
all nations where newer technology has displaced the passenger
train as the principal means of long-distance intercity trans-
portation. The nearly invariable response to the problem is subsi-
dization in one form or another. The relevant concerns are to
apply the subsidy so that those benefitting from the service bear
the cost and to minimize the total cost burden.
Although the American and British requirements for rail pas-
senger transportation are different, the British concept-
originating demand for the service at the regional level and split-
2 6 In the area of railroad services particularly, the agency can readily expand its scope
of activities. Many freight lines which produce only marginal traffic are being abandoned
by carriers, often to the detriment of the small shippers who rely on them while unable to
generate enough traffic to sustain them. A regional agency could conceivably approach this
problem in a similar way as it has done with the passenger problem, i.e., provide deficit
subsidies where services are necessary to regional economic welfare. In the case of freight
service subsidies, the payments would be made to the private carrier operating the line
rather than to a public corporation. See Carter, Solutions for Abandonment Problems and
for Marginal New Rail Line, 72 RAILWAY MANAGEMENT REV. No. 3, at 1 (1972).
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ting costs so that the government provides a reasonable subsidy
for service that is necessary-is a sound one which can be applied
to meet the American needs. The public corporation and the
interstate compact are means for implementing this concept that
are familiar to the American legal system.
-Vincent J. Tove
